We demonstrate how precision of public and private information in an economy can be measured. We develop and apply a procedure to test the welfare implications of a beauty and non-beauty contest based on survey forecasts of interest rates and yields in a large country sample over an extended period of time. In most countries, interest rate forecasts are unbiased and consistent with both models, but are rarely supported by yield forecasts. In half of the countries, a higher precision of public information regarding interest rates increases welfare. During forward guidance, public information is less precise than private information.
This paper develops a model of honest rational professional forecasters with different abilities and submits it to empirical verification using data on 3- and 12-months ahead forecasts of short-term interest rates and of long-term bond yields for up to 33 countries collected by Consensus Economics. The main finding is that in many countries, less-precise forecasters weigh public information more heavily than more-precise forecasters who weigh their own private information relatively more heavily. One implication of this result is that less-precise forecasters herd after more-precise forecasters even in the absence of strategic considerations.
The second part of the paper discusses and examines the cross-country relationships between measures of forecast uncertainty, the dispersion of forecasts across individual forecasters and the variabilities of short-term interest rates and of long-term bonds. The main findings are the following: (i) Forecast uncertainty and dispersion are positively and significantly related across countries for both rates and yields. (ii) A similar positive, albeit somewhat weaker, association is found between uncertainty and variability. (iii) The dispersion of short-term interest rate forecasts and the variability of those rates are also positively associated. The paper also documents differences between the average forecasting errors of more- and less-able forecasters as well as substantial correlations between the forecast errors of different forecasters.
In a large sample of countries across different geographic regions and over a long period of time, we find limited country- and variable-specific effects of central bank transparency on forecast accuracy and their dispersion among a large set of professional forecasts of financial and macroeconomic variables. More communication even increases forecast errors and dispersion.
In this paper, I derive and apply three univariate methods and one bivariate method to estimate permanent and transitory components of the American output growth path during the period 1790 to 2017. The results show that statistical tests give little to support the hypothesis of significant permanent growth rate changes (univariate methods). Permanent shifts in the output level have been rather small in the post-war period (bivariate method).
This data set contains meta data for speeches from the BIS
"Central Bankers' Speeches" database. Meta data include the exact date of the speech and the central bank that spoke. The data set is updated to September 2017.